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The launch of new intellectual initiatives is always a 
moment of great promise, especially in the case of 
one that aims to showcase the work of graduate stu-
dents. Scholarship pushes forward not because estab-
lished scholars explore new boundaries but because 
the scientific community is constantly infused with 
new generations of scholars and ideas that force us 
to look closely at what we thought we understood. 
The aim of advanced research is not to work closely 
with established experts, finding new ways to repeat 
and confirm established arguments. Rather, it should 
challenge what we know, pushing the scientific com-
munity to look for new frontiers of knowledge. This 
journal is a welcome venue for this venture and ad-
venture.
It comes at a time of great turmoil in politics, at both 
the domestic and international levels. The current 
global economic crisis is both a symptom and cause 
of great transformations in the economic and political 
order of the last half century. This is especially the case 
with the European Union. 2010 was supposed to be 
its breakthrough year. After nearly a decade embroiled 
in a seemingly endless debate about institutional re-
form, the EU could look to the Lisbon treaty as the map 
to guide its way through internal politics and even a 
central position on the global stage. The first signs of 
the global financial crisis seemed to confirm Europe’s 
approach to economic governance and placed it in 
a position to be the model for transnational govern-
ance on a global scale. The Copenhagen summit on 
climate change had the potential to put into relief the 
EU’s global leadership and its normative power. Yet 
as a new year begins, not only were the lofty aspira-
tions dashed, but a serious crisis of confidence has 
sunk into the EU. Even measured political leaders have 
mused openly about the future of the single currency 
and of the EU itself. 
We have read and heard a great deal about the vola-
tile economic climate of the last three years; there is 
no reason to try to repeat it here. But in order for us to 
understand what it means for how we study the EU 
and more generally contemporary politics, it is worth 
while to stop briefly to examine what were its major 
manifestations. While the more enduring effects of 
the last few years are yet to be determined, there is 
a lingering sense that nothing will be like it was be-
fore. This raises a number of challenges for those who 
study the EU. A quick glance at the major journals and 
books in recent years provides scant evidence that the 
EU would run into the problems that it did in the re-
cent economic crisis. Could this be the equivalent for 
EU studies of what the sudden end of the Cold War 
meant for international relations? How did the EU go 
from being seen on the precipice of assuming a role 
as a global leader to the current crisis of confidence? 
More importantly, why did scholarship on the EU not 
see it coming? Political scientists have enjoyed the dis-
comfort of economics in the wake of the economic 
crisis, with its certainty about economic models shak-
en. But we too need to take a closer look at what we 
took as a certainty.
The global economy, and to lesser extent Europe’s, 
had experienced a period of strong relative growth in 
the first decade of the new millennium. Low borrow-
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ing costs, emerging economic powers (China’s admis-
sion to the WTO in 2002 was an important milestone) 
and expanding commercial and financial markets 
were just a few of the factors that led to optimism that 
the new economy would be free of turmoil and insta-
bility. The development of new financial instruments 
was supposed to provide ways to reduce uncertainty 
in markets by pooling different forms of risk. Cheap 
and available credit helped governments struggling 
to keep public finances under control (without having 
to make difficult decisions) just as much as it fuelled 
housing booms in the United States, Ireland and Spain. 
All seemed to moving along smoothly with few signs 
of trouble on the horizon or reported in the scholarly 
journals.
It was easy to see the crisis as primarily an American 
problem when the first signs of trouble emerged in 
2007. American consumers had been on a spending 
binge for most of the decade and its banking system 
had engaged in activities that could be described, at 
best, as highly risky. European banks, often seen as too 
conservative and stodgy, suddenly seemed like solid, 
safe havens. Indeed, more than one commentator 
and political leader began to speculate that Europe’s 
moment had come, with the euro possibly becoming 
the global reserve currency. Yes, the downturn in the 
American economy might cause some disruption but 
few, in the early months of 2008, expected that the EU 
would be shaken to its core within two years. 
There a too many steps and phases between the op-
timism of a few years ago and the aftermath of the 
sovereign debt crisis to mention here. We can simply 
say that there were two phases to the crisis. The first 
was primarily the reaction to the financial crisis in the 
United States in late 2008 and early 2009. What is strik-
ing in this first phase is how the immediate reflex by 
member states, after nearly twenty years of the single 
market and a decade of the single currency, was to 
save national banks and industries. From the unilateral 
decision by the Irish government to protect all of its 
depositors to the French government declaring that 
any aid to automobile manufacturers would be only 
for plants located in France, the logic of even a coordi-
nated European response was lost in the scramble to 
protect national interests. But the problems of this first 
phase were only a hint of what was to come when the 
crisis entered into its second phase at the end of 2009. 
The admission by the newly elected Greek govern-
ment in October 2009 that previous deficit targets had 
seriously underestimated borrowing requirements set 
off a ripple that soon became a wave. What emerged 
was a consensus that there were serious structural im-
balances in the governing of the European economy. 
This refers not only to the flows of capital within the 
eurozone but also to the fact that the single currency 
did not have the political tools to deal with a sovereign 
debt and fiscal crisis. After a decade of arguing over 
the weight of votes in the Council or whether a new 
figure responsible for foreign policy would launch the 
EU as a global actor, Europeans discovered that the 
real institutional reform that they needed was to cre-
ate a means to transfer funds from member states that 
had saved to those that were spendthrift. More impor-
tantly, it was also quite clear that there was little pub-
lic support for such a move amongst those countries 
that had their financial houses in order.
There are a number of lessons that we may draw from 
the last three years that should lead us to think about 
the way we understand the EU and global governance 
in general. First, almost from its first signs in 2008, the 
economic turmoil revealed that economic national-
ism remains part of the cognitive map of policy-mak-
ers in the member states. Conventional wisdom holds 
that the last sixty years dedicated to the creation of a 
European economic space had created levels of eco-
nomic interdependence that negated the appeal of 
economic nationalism. This is a tenet that is widely 
shared amongst policy-makers as well as proponents 
of neo-functionalism and institutionalism. The argu-
ment is based on the premise that integration has 
brought about a transformation in the formation of 
interests so that key actors cannot distinguish national 
economic objectives from those of the EU. The early 
reaction to the first signs of serious troubles across the 
Atlantic challenged these assertions. Member states 
quickly took measures to prop up their own banks 
and issue guarantees to protect their depositors, even 
after agreeing that they would not do so at a summit 
in October 2008. The beggar-thy-neighbour policies 
continued with various stimulus packages that were 
introduced and were very much part of the critique 
of Germany in the second phase of the crisis. This is 
not to say that protectionism has returned to Europe 
but that we need to assess to what extent how much 
“Europeanization” has taken place. Despite twenty 
years of “convergence” criteria, benchmarking, open 
method of coordination and the like, the economic 
crisis laid clear that European economies remain fun-
damentally different with respect to policy outputs 
and outcomes. The fear that it would be hard to hold 
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together a union with so much diversity may become 
more real than many would hope. Convergence was 
seen as necessary not only to avoid the fiscal imbal-
ances of the last decade but also to ensure that there 
would be the necessary political and public support 
for any corrective measures.
Second, central to the post-war European story has 
been Germany’s transformation from being at the 
centre of instability in Europe to its role as the anchor 
of a European polity. This was enshrined in the Maas-
tricht treaty when, in the wake of German reunifica-
tion, the Federal Republic took the bold step of com-
mitting itself to the creation of the single currency, 
thus abandoning the symbol of Germany’s post-war 
recovery. Tied to this narrative of a European Germany 
were the central pillars of Germany’s economy that 
supposedly looked to Europe for accessible markets 
for its goods and services. All this contributed to the 
conventional wisdom that German and European 
interests were indistinguishable. Events over the last 
two years have revealed that perhaps Germany did 
have a national interest after all, and that it might be 
distinguishable from what the rest of the EU wanted it 
to be. Chancellor Angela Merkel was criticized for not 
showing adequate “leadership” (that is, not accepting 
the conventional wisdom of a European Germany) 
and pandering to domestic political pressures. Sur-
veys consistently show that German public opinion 
is opposed to any for of transfers to peripheral coun-
tries facing sovereign debt problems. The German 
media has picked up on this theme, which has served 
to tighten the Chancellor’s room to manoeuvre. Also 
constraining Germany’s ability to seek out new forms 
of economic governance is the increasingly vigilant 
role assumed by its constitutional court, which has 
sent clear and unequivocal messages that any fur-
ther transfers of powers to the EU level would require 
broad consensus within Germany. More immediately, 
it was considered likely that the Court would strike 
down any new structure that smacked of a perma-
nent mechanism to bail out member states in the eu-
rozone. Major changes require re-opening the Treaty, 
and after the battles that eventually led to the Lisbon 
treaty, Germany is not the only member state that 
would have preferred not to kick that hornet’s nest. 
But perhaps the greatest challenge to the notion of 
a Germany firmly tied to and by the EU is that per-
haps its interests are drifting in a different direction in 
a rapidly changing global economy. The percentage 
of German trade that is tied to Europe has been de-
clining steadily the last decade. Moreover, its recipe 
for success in the last decade – wage moderation 
and structural economic reforms – has proven hard 
to implement in many parts of the eurozone. It would 
be difficult to convince German voters that they help 
bail-out their partners after they have been told by 
their leaders that wage moderation and welfare state 
restructuring was the price to be paid for competitive-
ness in the global economy. 
Third, it is early days yet but the all the attention paid 
to institutional change and the Lisbon treaty has been 
disproportionate to its impact. Meant to bring citizens 
closer to the Union and to rationalise decision-mak-
ing, it provided neither during the crisis. If anything, 
what was brought into relief was that the EU institu-
tions were largely on the sidelines, including the ECB 
to a certain extent. More importantly, it also became 
evident that the sorts of instruments to address the 
structural imbalances mentioned above would prob-
ably require yet more treaty reform. They also will, in 
all likelihood, make EU decision-making more opaque 
with even greater distance between citizens and the 
decisions that affect them. For instance, the intro-
duction of a “European semester”, whereby member 
states present their national budgets to their partners 
even before their national assemblies is surely going 
in the opposite direction that was hoped for when the 
process started in Laeken in 2001.
What does all of this tell us for research in international 
politics and especially for graduate research? First, it 
suggests that scholars, like generals, almost always are 
fighting the last war. Our ways of understanding phe-
nomenon are shaped by what has happened, with the 
temptation tick with our cognitive frameworks even 
in the face of different conditions and circumstances.. 
For instance, a constant refrain that was heard during 
the last two years is that European integration has al-
ways been pushed ahead by “crisis”. Even if this were 
the case (and this is a debatable point), it tells us lit-
tle as to why this crisis happened the way that it did, 
at this point in time and because of what factors. In 
other words, it alerts us to the need to be aware that 
we need to find a way to balance contingency with 
structure in our understanding of politics.
Second, the events of the last few years are a useful 
reminder that we should heed Philippe Schmitter’s 
warning that any theory of European integration also 
needs to be able to account for disintegration. Our 
main frameworks for understanding the EU – inter-
governmentalism, institutionalism, and even con-
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6structivism – could not account for the possibility that 
the EU in 2010 was not the same one that the aca-
demic journals had been reporting for the last 15 years. 
We could accept the argument that recent events are 
simply more of the same “muddling through” and that 
this has been the way that the EU has gone ahead 
throughout its history. This means accepting that the 
context in which the main actors have to operate has 
not changed; that the EU’s internal dynamics operate 
in a vacuum unaffected by broader global develop-
ments. This points to the challenge of finding the bal-
ance between the domestic and international levels, 
between the instruments of comparative politics and 
international relations. 
Finally, the global economic crisis, along with the chal-
lenges presented by climate change, energy, food and 
so on, points to the need for this type of journal to 
breathe new life into our understanding of the world. 
It highlights the need to find the balance between es-
tablished ways of thinking and finding venues for new 
ideas that push the frontiers of knowledge. Pushing 
boundaries is always fraught with risk; but I am sure 
that readers of this journal will conclude, upon reading 
the work of young scholars, that it is a risk worth taking.
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